Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries by Prescott, Edward & Shell, Karl
CAE Working Paper #02-08
Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries
by





.Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries
Edward C. Prescott
Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota
55455; and





Department of Economics, Cornell University, 402 Uris Hall, Ithaca, New York
14853-7601
ks22@cornell.edu
Version: August 24, 2002
This introduces the symposium on sunspots and lotteries. Two stochastic general-
equilibrium concepts, Sunspot Equilibrium (SE) and Lottery Equilibrium (LE), are com-
pared. It is shown that, for some general, pure-exchange economies which allow for
consumption non-convexities or moral hazards, the set of LE allocations is equivalent to
the set of SE allocations provided that the randomizing device can generate events of any
probability. Journal of Economic Literature classiﬁcation numbers: D51, D82, D84, E32.
What are the connections between sunspot equilibrium (SE) and lottery equi-
librium (LE)? Both SE and LE are general equilibrium concepts in which extrinsic
uncertainty plays an essential role. Uncertainty is said to be extrinsic if it does
not aﬀect the economic fundamentals (such as preferences, endowments, and tech-
nologies). The sole purpose of extrinsic uncertainty is to introduce randomization
into allocations. The initial histories of and motivation for SE and LE are quite
diﬀerent.
“Sunspots” were introduced by Cass and Shell1 to explain “excess market volatil-
ity.” The earliest SE models were based on standard, convex overlapping-generations
economies in which rational agents condition their expectations on an extrinsic ran-
dom variable called “sunspots.” These expectations are self-fulﬁlling, thus showing
how the market economy can generate uncertainty (in addition to transmitting un-
certainty about the fundamentals). These SE allocations are necessarily ineﬃcient
in strictly convex economies because a feasible allocation in which sunspots mat-
t e rc a na l w a y sb eP a r e t od o m i n a t e di ns u c has e t t i n gb ya na l l o c a t i o ni nw h i c h
sunspots are ignored.
Lotteries were introduced into general equilibrium theory by Prescott and Townsend2
to model the market allocation of resources in situations with moral hazards. The
Prescott and Townsend lottery equilibria assume large economies with a ﬁnite
number of types, though extensions to an inﬁnite number of types are possible
in essentially the same way extensions are carried out for standard Arrow-Debreu
1See Shell [37] and Cass and Shell [5].
2See Prescott and Townsend [31, 32].
1economies.3 With expected utility maximization and continuous utility, all the
standard results for ﬁnite agent convex economies hold. In particular, the ﬁrst
and second welfare theorem and the standard existence arguments are valid.4 An
advantage of the LE approach is that the LE economies are convex and therefore
easily dealt with using standard general equilibrium tools. An advantage of us-
ing a continuum of economic agents is that the modeler can ignore the names of
the agents. Names do not matter in applied analyses as economic statistics are
reported on an anonymous basis for categories of people and it is a legal principle
that policies are anonymous.
Rogerson [35] considered an economy with a labor indivisibility. The competitive
equilibrium allocation for his economy without a randomizing device is eﬃcient by
the ﬁrst welfare theorem. However, if there is a randomizing device, the economy
is diﬀerent and the competitive allocation for the economy without a randomizing
device is not eﬃcient in the economy with a randomizing device. Shell and Wright
[40] identiﬁed the same phenomenon in SE economies. From the results of Garratt,
Keister, Qin and Shell [14] and Kehoe, Levine, and Prescott [24], we know that, for
the perfect-market economies treated in this symposium, SE allocations are eﬃcient
because they yield the same utilities as eﬃcient LE allocations. In fact, it is easy
to see that the ﬁrst welfare theorem also applies directly to the sunspots economies
treated in this symposium. Thus it is important to bear in mind the distinction
between introducing sunspots into an underlying economy where the ﬁrst welfare
theorem does not hold (due to, say, market imperfections or the double inﬁnity of
commodities and consumers in the overlapping-generations model) and introducing
sunspots to allow for welfare-improving randomization when nonconvexities are
present. The papers in this symposium focus on the latter approach.
The sunspots economy is typically constructed from the corresponding certainty
economy5 by (1) introducing an extrinsic randomizing device, i.e. a set of extrinsic
states of nature and a probability measure over the states, and (2) expanding the
commodity and the technology sets to accommodate the extrinsic states of nature.
For example, if the number of sunspots states is S,a n dXh,Y f,a n dωh are re-
spectively consumption sets, production sets, and endowments in the underlying








are respectively the consumption sets, the production sets, and the endowments
for the sunspots economy. Hence technologies and endowments are independent of
sunspots. It is also assumed that preferences are suitably symmetric with respect
to sunspot states.6 Goods prices depend on the realized state of nature (e.g. the
3Following the extension of Mas Colell [26], and Jones [23] to a continuum of diﬀerentiated
commodities, the commodity space is signed measures.
4Like in Debreu [10], the commodity space has inﬁnite dimesion, but the economy is convex
and the number of types ﬁnite.
5In general, the underlying economy need not be a certainty economy. It might include intrinsic
uncertainty.
6Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences are consistent with extrinsic uncertainty, but these
are not the only preferences consistent with extrinsic uncertainty. See Balasko [4], for a general,
abstract deﬁnition of extrinsic uncertainty.
2price of chocolate in sunspot state α). There might also be securities contingent
upon the sunspot state (e.g. chocolate to be delivered in state α, or dollars to
be delivered in state β). Some SE models allow for state-contingent securities;
others do not. Hence the sunspots economy is the special case (for which there is
extrinsic uncertainty) of an Arrow-Debreu economy. The pure sunspots economy
can be viewed as the limit economy, in which the eﬀects on the fundamentals of
intrinsic uncertainty are small.7 In the SE model, the extrinsic states of nature are
essential. In principle, it is possible for the price of a given bundle in one state to
diﬀer from the price of the same bundle in another state, even if the two states are
equally probable: the law-of-one-price applies to a given commodity or commodity
bundle in a given state.
In the lottery economy, the commodity space is the space of signed measures
on the Borel sigma algebra of the underlying consumption sets. Instead of buy-
ing and selling goods, agents buy and sell probabilities of points in the underlying
commodity space. Each consumer spreads extrinsic probability over points in the
commodity space so as to maximize his ex-ante expected utility subject to incentive
and other constraints as well as aﬀordability.8 In an LE world, a given bundle deliv-
ered with a given probability is the basic commodity to which the law-of-one-price
applies. A ﬁrm that buys or sells these measures must have a randomizing device,
but it trades in probabilities, not states. For example if each of ten customers has a
one-tenth probability of receiving the good, then the randomizing device must gen-
erate ten exclusive events each with probability one-tenth. (There is, of course, the
usual Arrow-Debreu event-contingent trading where the event in question aﬀects
the technology or preferences or both.)
The early LE and the early SE models also diﬀer in their capacities for coordi-
nating stochastic allocations. Consider, for example, an economy with an integer
number N units of an indivisible good and 2N consumers. One possible allocation
is that each individual receive one unit of the indivisible good with probability 1
2.
This stochastic allocation would be feasible if the probabilities were coordinated to
ensure that ex post no more than half of the population is receiving the indivisible
good. In the SE model, this coordination is guaranteed through market clearing
in extrinsic-state-dependent contracts. In the example, half the population would
hold contracts for delivery of one unit of the indivisible good in a state that occurs
with probability 1
2, while the other half would hold contracts for delivery of one
unit of the good in another (mutually exclusive) state that also occurs with proba-
bility 1
2. The early SE models were based on a ﬁnite sunspot-state space and either
a ﬁnite number of consumers or a countably inﬁnite number of consumers from
the overlapping-generations model. The early (and indeed most of the) LE mod-
els were based on a continuum of consumers and continuous probability. Because
of the “law of large numbers,” coordination is not necessary with a continuum of
agents. Hence in the early LE models, stochastic allocations could be determined
by simple (uncoordinated) individual coin ﬂips.
Kenneth Arrow appears to be the ﬁrst to have suggested that there is a con-
nection between LE allocations and SE allocations. According to Prescott and
7See Manuelli and Peck [27]
8The set-up is simpler in actual applications of the LE approach, where the focus has been
on cases in which the underlying consumption set can be reduced to a ﬁnite number of bundles.
Then the LE consumption set can be viewed as the set of probability measures over these bundles.
In these cases, LE can be computed as a standard linear programming problem. See Townsend
[42] and Prescott and Townsend [34].
3Townsend,9 Arrow conjectured that the LE allocations in the Prescott and Townsend
[31] paper could be implemented as SE allocations. Shell and Wright [40] picked
up on this point. In their study of sunspots and indivisible goods, they showed
that the LE allocations in the Rogerson [35] and Hansen [18] indivisible work-eﬀort
models can be implemented as SE allocations.
The Hansen and Rogerson models, like all LE models up till then, were based
on a continuum of agents. Garratt [12] extended the Prescott-Townsend LE model
to allow for a ﬁnite number of agents. Since the “law of large numbers” does not
apply in the ﬁnite case, Garratt had to give the LE auctioneer a role in coordinating
probabilities. In the extended LE model, feasibility of an allocation also requires
that each individual lottery be the marginal distribution of some common joint lot-
tery. In the example, each agent holds a lottery ticket that pays oﬀ with probability
1
2 but the auctioneer coordinates the individual lotteries so that ex post only half of
t h et i c k e t sa r ew i n n e r s . 10 In a model with nonconvexities in consumption, a ﬁnite
number of underlying commodities, a ﬁnite number of agents, and complete mar-
kets, Garratt [12] showed that every Prescott-Townsend-Garratt LE allocation can
be implemented as an SE allocation, but not all SE allocations are LE allocations.
For Garratt [12], the LE model was implicitly based on a continuous randomizing
device, while the probability device for the SE model was variable. Not all SE
allocations based on a ﬁnite randomizing device are also SE allocations in the con-
tinuous randomizing device case.11 What if we compare the LE allocations with SE
allocations in which the common randomizing device is continuous, so that there
can be events for every probability?
In their paper in this symposium, Garratt, Keister, Qin, and Shell [14] analyze
a pure-exchange economy with a ﬁnite number of consumers with possible non-
convexities in preferences and consumption sets, symmetric information, a common
continuous randomizing device, and perfect markets. Their principal result is that
in this environment equilibrium allocations can be supported by sunspot-contingent
prices that are co-linear with sunspot probabilities. This result extends to the case
with a ﬁnite number of equally probable sunspot states, but it does not extend to
more general discrete probability devices. Garratt, Keister, Qin and Shell use their
result on SE prices to show that the set of LE allocations is the same as the set of
SE allocations based on a continuous, or unconstrained, sunspots device,o n et h a t
can generate events of any probability.
In their paper in this symposium, Kehoe, Levine, and Prescott [24] analyze
pure-exchange economies with a continuum of agents, private information, indivisi-
bilities, and a randomizing device that can generate events of any probability. They
show that any sunpots competitive equilibrium allocation can be supported by a
lottery equilibrium with the ex-post distribution of consumptions over individuals
and ex-ante expected utilities being the same. They also show how to support a
9See Prescott and Townsend [31], page 18.
10The joint lottery constructed by the auctioneer performs the same role as the sunspots variable
in that it assigns probabilities to events in which the diﬀerent (feasible) pure allocations occur.
However, agents are not allowed to make trades conditional on these events (they are known only
by the auctioneer) and hence the extended lottery model is diﬀerent from the sunspots model
where extrinsic-state contingent trades are allowed. For more on this see Garratt, Keister, and
Shell [15].
11In fact, some SE based on a ﬁn i t es u n s p o td e v i c ed on o ts u r v i v er e ﬁnement of the state space
to (ﬁner) ﬁnite partitions. The question of whether SE are robust to all reﬁnements of the state
space (ﬁnite or continuous) is studied in Goenka and Shell [16] and Garratt and Keister [13]. See
Antinolﬁ and Keister [3] for a related notion called strong sunspot immunity.
4lottery equilibrium allocation as a sunspot equilibrium. In addition, they establish
that with decreasing absolute risk-aversion and no indivisibilities, proper lotteries
(i.e. lotteries in which not all probabilities are zero or one) are not employed in equi-
librium. They provide a numerical example with increasing absolute risk-aversion
in which proper lotteries are actively employed in equilibrium.
Generalizing results of Hansen [18] , they show that there is a stand-in household
for each type and that each of these stand-ins have convex, continuous preferences
on the traded goods. All uncertainty is dealt with within the household or, equiv-
alently, through a mutual insurance arrangement. In the Hansen example, the
stand-in household sells a number of workweeks of the standard length and services
of capital and buys the consumption and investment good. The randomization as to
how much each member of the stand-in household consumes and whether he works
is done within the stand-in household. Unlike the Prescott-Townsend framework,
there are empirical counterparts of the traded commodities and the national income
and product accounts for the model economies can be constructed.
What if the lotteries and the sunspot states are restricted to those that can
be generated from the same underlying, ﬁnite probability device? For the LE
from this constrained model, there is in equilibrium a unique price for any feasible
probability, but prices are not necessarily linear in probabilities. For the SE from
this restricted model, there is in equilibrium a unique price for each feasible event,
prices are linear in events, but the price of a given probability is not necessarily
unique. In an unpublished paper, Garratt, Keister, and Shell [15] provide examples
of SE allocations based on ﬁnite randomizing devices that are not LE allocations.
Nonetheless, Garratt, Keister, and Shell [15] show that for most ﬁnite randomizing
devices the set of LE allocations and the set of SE allocations are equivalent.
Despite very diﬀerent histories and diﬀerent motivations, it turns out that lot-
tery equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium lead to essentially the same competi-
tive allocations for the special environment analyzed in this symposium: namely,
economies with a ﬁnite number of individual types, no distortions and an un-
constrained randomizing device (which can generate events with any probability).
Even when there is equivalence of allocations, it is worthwhile to retain both equi-
librium concepts: each has its own strengths. For example, Garratt and Keister
[13] show how an open question regarding the robustness of sunspot equilibria is
easily solved by looking at the lottery formulation of the problem. The SE ap-
proach is based on the familiar contingent-commodities approach, and as such is
easily applied to a wide variety of settings. On the other hand, the LE approach
appears to provide a better basis for computing equilibria. For example, in com-
puting LE with indivisible goods, one faces a relatively simple linear-programming
problem12 rather than the full-blown non-linear integer-programming problem that
would seem to arise in computing SE. The implementation of the continuum of
individual speciﬁc lotteries so as to guarantee that actual and expected payouts
are equal absent private information is straightforward.13 For suﬃciently large but
ﬁnite numbers of individuals with L2 preferences, the approximation is arbitrarily
good even with private information.14
The LE approach has also been applied to the “nonconvexities” arising because
of incentive constraints in the consumption set. Cole [7] points out that lotteries
sometimes do more than just convexify private information economy. He shows
12See Prescott [33] for an excellent survey.
13See Anderson [2] and Green [17].
14See Uhlig [43].
5that absent lotteries the private informaton economy of Prescott and Townsend
[31] is convex, yet lotteries are needed for the Pareto eﬃciency. In addition, the
LE concept has also been applied to real nonconvexities arising in labor markets
because a given person can only supply one type of workweek and workweeks can
be of many lengths. The Hansen [18], Rogerson [35], and Shell and Wright [40]
applications all have the constraint that each individual either works full time or
not at all. Hansen and Sargent [19] have regular time as well as overtime workweek
lengths. Hornstein and Prescott [22] and Alpanda [1] endogenize this workweek,
permitting it to take any length. This ext e n s i o ni su s e db yK y d l a n da n dP r e s c o t t
[25] in their study of U.S. business cycles and by Cole and Ohanian [8] and Hayashi
and Prescott [20] in their studies of great depressions. Fitzgerald [11] uses the
construct, but with multiple skill types, to study the distributive and eﬃciency
consequences of policies that constrain the workweek length . Osuna and Rios-Rull
[29] study the problem of implementing a 35 hour work week using an overtime tax.
Cole and Prescott [9] apply the LE concept to clubs, where there the commodity
point must be indexed by individual and club type. Caucutt [6] applies the club
concept to model the consequence of peer group eﬀects in schooling if schooling
is competitively provided. Prescott and Townsend [34] model ﬁrms using clubs in
general equilibrium. Prescott and Rios-Rull [30] use lotteries in a search model to
overcome the non-convexity arising due to the fact that a person can only be at one
place at a given point in time. Lotteries play a role in mechanism design going back
to Myerson [28], Harris and Townsend [21], and Prescott and Townsend [31, 32].
An important paper on LE and mechanism design is Townsend [42].
The SE concept has been applied in a wide variety of economic settings starting
with overlapping-generations models. The extensive SE literature (both theoretical
and applied) has been reviewed in Shell [38], Shell and Smith [39], and most recently
in Spear and Wright [41]; we do not provide a systematic review here. Sources of
proper sunspot equilibria include: the overlapping-generations “double-inﬁnity” of
consumers and dated commodities15, restricted market participation (as naturally
arises in OG and other economies), missing markets and other budget restrictions,
money and other sources of “indeterminacy”, imperfect competition, externalities
(an important case of missing markets), private information, non-convexities, reg-
ulatory restrictions, bounded rationality, and optimal banking mechanisms.
In much of the literature, sunspot equilibrium provides “symmetry-breaking”
because proper SE are in these cases asymmetric outcomes in symmetric economies.
These SE reﬂect the uncertainty generated by the market economy. These SE
are typically non-optimal. They are often instances of indeterminacy of equilibria.
With non-convexities (the focus of the present symposium), sunspots (and lotteries)
can move the economy from asymmetric outcomes to symmetric outcomes. Hence,
in the non-convex case SE (and LE) can be “symmetry-making”.
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